Lagen des Rechts – Constellations of Law – Constellations du droit – Costellazioni del diritto – Constelaciones del derecho – Constelações do Direito
Table of Contents
In den unterschiedlichsten Zusammenhängen scheinen die Begriffe exemplum und exceptio eine diffuse Einheit zu bilden. Besonders eindrücklich hat ihre gegenseitige Interferenz zuletzt Giorgio Agamben in seiner Diskursgeschichte des homo sacer herausgearbeitet. Der Blick auf dessen römische Wurzeln legt ein dialektisch konzipiertes Phänomen frei, das die verschwommene Grenze zwischen einem Innen und einem Aussen überschreitet und die Determinanten überkommener Referenzverfahren zu verkehren scheint: In Rede steht das Beziehungsgeflecht von Besonderem und Allgemeinem, von Einzelnem und Gemeinschaft, von Exklusion und Inklusion, von Deduktion und Induktion.
Normative Ordnungen brauchen sowohl Ausnahmen wie Beispiele: Religion (und die Theologie), das Recht (und die Jurisprudenz), die Erziehung (und die Pädagogik). Schliesslich braucht und kennt sie die Rhetorik, die vormals auch die einzige Wissenschaft aller Ausnahmen und Beispielen war. Historisch und systematisch sind Beispiele und Ausnahmen in der Rhetorik gewissermassen zu Hause; von dort aus fanden sie Eingang in andere normative Ordnungen und Wissenschaften. Das sind die Fakten. Zur Diskussion steht jedoch: Wie werden Ausnahmen und Beispiele gebraucht?
In the remote areas of legal scholarship, far away from the legal mainstream, the boundries of law are explored. These secret dimly lit societies fathom paradoxes in law. A paradox, so they say, is like God, an “indicable whole”. It “is an evanescent object, that is, a non-object oscillating between being (…) and not being”. One can hardly even talk about it: “Paradoxologists are people speaking about something that cannot be spoken about (so easily).” Rumour has it that spirits haunt this uncanny scenery: “The undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost – but an essential ghost – in every decision, in every event of decision.” Needless to say, it is not particularly easy to decipher what these rumours may mean. To say the least, the combining of law with paradoxes has led to some rather obscure results.
Beiträge zu neueren Entwicklungen im antiken Recht und in der Rechtstheorie - Contributions to recent developments in ancient law and legal theory
Eine Öffnung für im weitesten Sinne kulturwissenschaftliche Fragestellungen – für Fragen zur Rolle von Symbolen, Medien, Rhetorik, Ästhetik etc. – hat seit den 1990er Jahren viele geisteswissenschaftliche Fächer und in neuerer Zeit auch die Altphilologie und ihre Beschäftigung mit dem antiken Recht erfasst. So jedenfalls könnte ein vorläufiges methodologisches Fazit anlässlich einiger neuerer Publikationen zum antiken griechischen und römischen Recht lauten.
From the 1990s onwards, an openness towards questions that are in the broadest sense concerned with cultural studies – questions concerning the role of symbols, media, rhetoric, aesthetics etc. – has spread over many liberal arts subjects and recently also ancient philology and its dealings with ancient law. At least, this is what a preliminary methodological summary of some more recent publications on the subject of ancient Greek and Roman law might indicate.
Szenarien der Rechtsprechung bei Homer, Hesiod und Aischylos - Scenarios of jurisdiction in Homer, Hesiod and Aeschylus
Das griechische Götterpantheon, das im Kern aus den zwölf „Olympischen Göttern“ besteht, die eine Generation von älteren Göttern, die Titanen, abgelöst haben, kennt keine Gottheit, die explizit und ausschließlich als Gottheit der Gerechtigkeit oder des Rechts angesehen wurde.
The Greek pantheon, essentially consisting of the twelve „Olympian gods“ who replaced a generation of older gods (the Titans), does not include any divinity that was explicitly and exclusively regarded as a god of justice or of law.
Die Frage nach „Recht ohne Gesetz?“ ist die Frage nach dem Recht als Verfahren: die Frage danach, wie es zu verstehen ist (und wie es verstanden worden ist), dass das Recht – wie Susanne Gödde im Anschluss an Michael Gagarin und im Blick auf Hesiod schreibt – „eher als ‚Verfahren‘ (‚procedural law‘) und nicht als ‚substantiell‘(‚substantial law‘) aufgefasst“ wird.
The question of „Justice without law?“ is the question of the law as procedure: the question of how we are to understand the fact (and how that fact has been understood in the past) that the law – as Susanne Gödde writes, following Michael Gagarin’s thesis and with a glance at Hesiod – is „conceived … as being a ‘process’ (‘procedural law‘), rather than as ‘substantial’ (‘substantial law‘)“.
Denouncing Divinity: Blasphemy, Human Rights, and the Struggle of Political Leaders to defend Freedom of Speech in the Case of Innocence of Muslims
This article is about freedom of speech and the political responses to the blasphemous Innocence of Muslims video, which sparked international controversy in the fall of 2012. Politicians from multiple corners of the world spoke out on freedom of speech and its relation to blasphemy. Whereas one might expect that those politicians would abide by international human rights law, many of them issued statements that unequivocally undermined the principle of free speech enshrined in those human rights instruments. This article discusses a number of these political statements against the background of human rights standards.
Border Carbon Adjustments as a Tool for a Just Global Climate Regime
There is an urgent need to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions. Because climate change is caused by actions regardless of where they take place on earth, it is generally considered that effective action must take place on a global scale. So far, multilateral attempts to coordinate action on a global level have failed to implement measures that are expected to prevent dangerous climate change, and unilat- eral measures are now being considered as an alternative way of achieving emissions reductions out- side of this context. In light of this, some advocate the use of Border Carbon Adjustments to address the various problems that arise when carbon mitigation policies are implemented on a unilateral basis. There are several arguments for or against the use of Border Carbon Adjustments, and most of these are addressed in the economic, legal, and policy literature. Little has been said on the implications of Border Carbon Adjustments for justice. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Border Carbon Adjust- ments as a policy tool for the mitigation of climate change. This paper argues that, whilst Border Car- bon Adjustments may be an effective way of achieving unilateral emission reductions, they face problems as far as global distributive justice is concerned and they can easily be perceived as an unac- ceptable shift towards a hostile and aggressive form of multilateral diplomacy. For this reason, Border Carbon Adjustments should be viewed with great caution and, if used at all, careful attention should be paid to designing their implementation in accordance with principles of justice.
A specter is haunting Europe – the specter of separatism. Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, South Tyrol – all these regions have separatist movements pursuing independence from their current National State. The breakup of an EU Member State no longer seems impossible. To date, it is unclear what impact this would have on the EU membership of the new entities (with consequences for the character of citizenship, voting rights in the council, number of MEPs etc.) that emerge from the old States. The common rules of Public International Law governing the succession of States are insufficient in the case of a succession of States in the EU. Although the Treaties do not provide for such a situation and the past 60 years of European history offer only a few and not really persuasive precedents, the nature of the EU as a joint association of sovereign States (“Staatenverbund”) demands a special approach: A separated State will neither be automatically excluded from the EU nor will it automatically become a new Member State. Drawing on the ideas of Articles 49 and 50 TEU this essay develops a procedure for balancing the interests of the EU, its Member States, and the people living in the seceding State, who are likely to be pro-EU. If a Member State breaks up, both the remaining State and the new entity will continue to represent the former Member State in the European institutions. The former Member State will provisionally continue to exist for both the EU and its Member States with respect to European matters. A process of negotiation between the two “new” States themselves and with the other Member States will lead to a new balance within the EU and the adaption of the Treaties – the solution has to be a political one. If the negotiations are successful, the former Member State can finally be dissolved at the EU level. In this case either both new States will become new Members or the remaining State will continue the membership (with necessary modifications) while the separated State will become a new Member. No part of the State would have left the EU – not even for a moment. But if one Member State or one of the two concerned States rejects further negotiations – which must be considered every Member State’s due right – the breakup will be final ex nunc. Whether both States or just one of them leave(s) the EU (while the remaining State continues the former’s membership without being affected by the secession) would then be a question of classical Public International Law governing the succession of States. This solution identifies the legal order of the EU as preeminent while Public International Law is only subsidiary. This political and legal “Staatenverbund”-approach recognizes the EU as a special form of entity, a joint association of sovereign States.